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LOUIS DUMONT ON
THE NATIONAL VARIANTS
OF THE MODERN IDEOLOGY: II*
Leonidas Donskis
The National Variants of Modern Ideology
Dumont's strategy of research is based on his deep sense of the
relationship between a part and a whole in the history of ideas: "The history of ideas in the modern Occident would be considered as a whole, along
its main lines of development, in the fundamental unity it could not fail to
disclose when viewed against the background of a different civilization. [...]
The subject may be approached along three relatively concrete lines: one
historical, one that I would call configurational, and one national or 'subcultural.'"
In this essay the subject will be further approached along one of
these three lines - namely, along the subcultural line. Dumont, I should say,
employs the sociological term "subculture" by stressing the interdependence
of national cultures within the general ideological framework of modernity.
These national variants of modern ideology, or national subcultures
of the modern European culture, may well be called the national ideological
discourses, or ideological languages, of modernity by stressing the exceptional significance of national languages within the general ideological
framework of modern nationalism (as shown above, the latter is perceived
by Dumont as merely hypostatized individualism. He writes:
28

29

30

It may be objected that such an ideology [the modern ideology]
does not really exist, for what might be so called varies from one
country or one major language area to another. There are, for
example, English, French, German subcultures within European
culture. But the fact entails simply that we ought to take those
subcultures, or the corresponding ideologies, as so many variants
- of equal status - of modern ideology. Ideally, a concrete
knowledge of modern ideology would be attained if we could
pass from one variant to another in a systematic fashion, as if by
applying a set of transformations [...]."
*Louis Dumont of the National Variant of the Modern Ideology: Part I appeared in
Comparative Civilization Review (Fall 1994): 2-17.
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1995
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It should be noted that Dumont's introductory note about "so many
variants - of equal status [sic!] - of modern ideology" is not accidental. In
spite of the emphasis he has placed on the interdependence of the above
subideologies, not on these subideologies themselves, Dumont has come to
stress the equal status of the national subcultures of European culture. As
will be shown below, such an equality of cultures, that is, the principle of
equality, is considered by Dumant as but a manifestation of nominalistic
thinking. Does this reflect the flexibility of Dumont's approach which
allows him to employ deliberately the elements of nominalistic discourse by
placing them into the framework of holistic thinking, and thus by absorbing
them into a sphere of hierarchical complementarity?
We should say a few words about how a Dumontian study is analytically organized before following Dumontian thought approaching
Herder's and Fichte's ideas. This study is directed first to the problem of
German identity, as it has been exposed in Herder's idea of Volk and
Fichte's of Nation. According to Dumont,
[...] the basic procedure consisted in a comparison of configurations of ideas; the study was therefore essentially static and morphological, neither dynamic nor directly concerned with
inter-action. As the study developed, however, it appeared with
increasing force that German culture should be looked at not in
isolation but as involved in a vital relationship with its environment.
32

The first national variant is being associated with Herder's Volk and
Fichte's Nation. It is interesting to note that the former is here conceived as
a major polemicist against the English and particularly the French
Enlightenment and thus a pure phenomenon of the German national variant
of the upcoming modernity, while the latter is seen as the philosopher of the
French Revolution. Dumont is deeply concerned with the short-lived Sturm
und Drang movement at the time of which Herder had published Auch eine
Philosophic der Geschichte. This book (and especially its title) is something
like a reply to Voltaire who had introduced the term "philosophy of history."
Herder rehabilitates everything that the French and English eighteenth century rejected or ignored: the barbarous Middle Ages,
Ancient Egypt sacrificed to the glory of Greece, and perhaps
most important, religion. Instead of history consisting in the
accession of reason, a reason disembodied and everywhere identical to itself, Herder sees in history the contrasted interplay of
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol32/iss32/2
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individual cultures or cultural individuals, each constituting a
specific human community, or Volk, in which an aspect of general humanity is embodied in a unique and irreplaceable manner.
The German Volk, bearer of western Christian culture, is the
modern example of the category. In the flow of history there is
not only simply progress (Fortschritt) but, within each of the two
civilizational complexes, the ancient and the modern, what one
may call a succession of 'forward strivings' or blossomings
(Fortgang, Fortstreben), all 'of equal necessity, equal originality, equal merit, equal happiness' [..J.
33

At first sight, Herder may be perceived not only as a critic of the
modern universalist rationalism and of the one-dimensional belief in
never-ending progress mainly expressed in the French Enlightenment, but
also as a polemicist against the individualist French culture, as it had been
shaped mainly by Voltaire and the authors of the Encyclopedie. One would
think that Herder's definition of man would affirm this statement: to the contrary of the theoreticians of the Enlightenment, Herder speaks of man
belonging to a given cultural community (as Rousseau did), not of the
abstract and historyless individual, a representative of the human species.
It is, however, nothing but the first impression obviously lacking in
attentiveness to the important details of Herder's theoretical discourse. His
Auch eine Philosophic der Geschichte may be defined neither as simply a
call for collective identity in the age of universalist individualism totally
despising all the cultural differences and civilizational diversity of humanity nor as an intrusion of holism into a civilizational discourse dominated by
nominalism. To state this would be to simplify the reality of ideas produced
by Herder. It is small wonder, then, that Dumont points out:
In traditional holism, the society is exclusive, humankind coincides with the society formed by us, and strangers are devalued
as being, at best, imperfect men. By the way, even modern patriotism is tinged with that feeling. With Herder, on the contrary, all
cultures are recognized as equal in principle. It should be clear
that such an assertion is possible only because cultures are
viewed as so many individuals, equal among themselves
notwithstanding their difference; cultures are individuals of a
collective nature. In other words, Herder on the one hand discards individualism in favor of holism on the level of the elements, that is, when he considers individual human beings; but
on the other hand he uses the individualist principle by transferring it to the level of compounds [...] when he considers collective entities that before him were unacknowledged or subordiPublished by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1995
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nated. It would therefore be wrong to see Herder as rejecting
wholesale the individualist - mainly French - culture, for at the
same time he accepts a major feature of it in order to assert
against that very culture the existence and value of German culture and, with it, of all others that have flourished in history.
Therefore, taken globally, Herder's reaction must be located
within the modern value system. His holism must be seen as
contained within the individualism that he fiercely attacks - and
the circumstance may well account for the style of the book,
which is tense, screaming, almost panting.
34

In spite of the emergence of the notion of Humanitat - which evidently refers to that of universality - in his Ideen, Herder is seen by Dumont
as the theoretician combining the elements of both holism and individualism, or, at least, allowing Dumont to formalize the constituents of his discourse in hierarchical terms. "The superior level, for Herder himself, is the
global level of consideration, on which all cultures are present as individuals with equal right. As against the ethnocentricism of naive holism, this
shows adherence to modern individualism - transferred from the elementary
to the collective level. Holism is here encompassed in individualism; it is a
case of the encompassing of the contrary by which I defined hierarchy elsewhere [,..]."
Although Dumont's efforts in interpreting Herder's philosophy of
history may be evaluated as indeed interesting and, to be sure, unprecedented theoretical experiment of the hierarchy-oriented discourse, Dumont's
exemplification of the principle of hierarchy in action with the creation of
Eve from one of Adam's ribs in the first book of Genesis seems to be more
convincing. The same may be said about its exemplification with concentric circles. Religious texts serve for Dumont as the more convenient and
relevant intellectual space for his analytical thought - at least, in employing
his hierarchical terms - than the field of social philosophy which inevitably
comes into existence under the sign of the unique individuality and individual experience of its authors.
One of the most fruitful distinctions in Dumont's analysis of the
first national variant of modern ideology, as represented by Herder, is that
between the "ethnic theory" of nationalities and the "elective one." Since
Herder's and Renan's theories are pretty often considered as almost identical, or, at least, representing the same paradigm of Romantic nationalism,
Dumont's sharp distinction may throw a new light on this issue. He notes:
35

36

37

It may be said in all rigor that Herder posits a German sub-culture by the side of the French one within modern culture.
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol32/iss32/2
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Moreover, in doing so he lays the basis for what will be later the
'ethnic theory' of nationalities as against the 'elective theory,' in
which the nation rests essentially on consensus, on Renan's
'everyday plebiscite.' We have just seen that the ethnic theory
rests at bottom on the same equalitarian - i.e. individualistic basis as the elective theory does. The two theories are therefore
not completely independent of each other as is often assumed
nowadays [at the same time, they both are more often taken
without any distinction, as noted above; this is to say, they are
often taken for granted as almost identical theories]. They both
apply, albeit on different levels, the same modern principle of
equalitarian individualism.
38

Dumont's analysis of the main trends of German social thought
seems to have been consciously localized by choosing Herder's philosophy
of history as the typical case. Herder, however, was not the only German theoretician who has seen cultures as individuals, i.e. as the ontologically and
socioculturally unique, indivisible historic entities. Heinrich Riickert's conception of Culturtypus, Leo Frobenius' notion of Paideuma conceived of as
the mysterious substance of every living culture, and Oswald Spengler's theory of what he called the "historical morphology" show us how deeply this
theoretical tradition is rooted in both German Geschichtsphilosophie and
Kulturphilosophie.
Let me take an example. In his Lehrbuch der Weltgeschichte in
organischer Darstellung, Riickert has defined culture as "die Totalitat der
Erscheinungen... in welcher sich die Selbstandigkeit und Eigenthumlichkeit
der hoheren menschlichen Anlage ausspricht." It is extremely important at least, in the context of this essay - that Riickert, in his theory of the organic growth of culture, has employed such key terms as Culturkreis,
Culturreihe, Culturtypus, and Culturindividuum (!). The latter seems to be
of exceptional importance to grasp how deeply the so-called cultural individualism (rather in the methodological sense, that is, in taking culture as an
individual sui generis, not as some sort of social whole) is grounded in
essentially German theory of the organic growth of culture. Though Dumont
applies his analytical equipment to comment upon Tonnies' distinction
between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, he might have discussed this lineage of German social thought which is not so simply detachable from the
main tendencies of contemporary theoretical discourse.
The same may be said about the case of Spengler. One can see
Spengler's Der Untergang des Abendlandes as a certain culmination of
Herderian discourse except for their basic difference in general ideological
emphasis, or rather in overtones of metaphysical mood: Herder's highly pos39

49
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itive and even optimistic vision of the realm of historically unique cultures
has been transformed by Spengler into the extremely negative and pessimistic theory of the inexorable cul-de-sac and doom of Western civilization by exemplifying its alleged historic destiny with that of a number of
non-Western civilizations passed away from the historic stage.
Spengler's theory as well as Frobenius' notion of the mysterious
and mortal ontological nucleus of every culture (the latter, in fact, preceded
Spengler's "historical morphology") may be seen as the fall, or even as the
logical end of the life-cycle, of a Herderian discourse. And though Spengler
refers, from time to time, to the enormous influence of Goethe's natural theory of morphology, as consciously contrasted to traditional natural science,
on his own historiosophical construction, one may easily find a crucial role
of Nietzsche in the above fundamental shift of the German theoretical
thought.
Spengler's opus magnum, however, came to mean not merely a
simple and weak echo, or reminiscence, of ideas produced by Nietzsche one
generation earlier, as it has been pointed out by a number of Spengler's critics, but a quite new approach to the phenomena of Western civilization.
Spengler has uncovered a remarkable field of studies for both current civilizational sociologists and cultural theoreticians, to say nothing about his
contribution in urban studies. It goes without saying that the real value of
Spengler's apocalyptic philosophy of history as well as of his so-called morphological approach lies neither in his generalizing scheme nor in his summarizing concepts, sunk in the ocean of Spengler's heavyweighted, elegant
discourse, but in his throwing a new light on what seemed to be clear and
unquestionable for a long time.
Spengler's efforts to draw a strict line between mogliche Kultur and
wirkliche Kultur may remind us of the theoretical necessity of distinguishing between culture as an idea and culture as a body. (In Spengler's version
of cultural individualism, one may find its most radical shape: culture as an
idea precedes culture as a body; moreover, the former is explicitly taken as
ontologically prior to the latter.) An introduction and articulation of these
two dimensions of culture may help the theoretician in avoiding the confusion of both concepts and terms.
Finally cultural individualism seems to have eventually transcended its primary German theoretical background, or, in Dumont's own terms,
its German subcultural frame, by entering the anglo-saxon cultural anthropology. According to Kroeber and Kluckhohn, both German morphologists
of culture, Frobenius and Spengler, have elaborated the modern theoretical
framework within which a culture may be defined and described as the
autonomous dimension.
41
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Although Dumont stresses the parallel presence of two lineages in
German thought (his note about a Herderian - historicist or monadic - lineage sounds as if it were expressed by Dooyeweerd or Collingwood, i.e. by
a philosophical critic of the so-called radical historicism: the latter is, as a
rule, being identified with what is treated here as cultural individualism
rather than radical historicism conceived in its Hegelian - universal and
global - sense), he might have shown the evident tendency of these lineages
toward the transcending of their original subcultural boundaries. This statement may be exemplified with the interdependence between German cultural morphology and Toynbee's historico-cultural monadology.
The second lineage in German thought - according to Dumont, that
which Fichte, Kant, and Hegel belong to - has also been subculturally translated into, at least, three subcultures of European culture: those of England,
Italy, and Russia. The latter, likewise the phenomena of Russian Slavophiles
and especially of Danilevsky's historiosophical theory of historico-cultural
types that have specifically reflected the historicist and monadic lineage in
German thoiight, has always tended to absolutize the basic presuppositions
of the initiating lineage, while the both of the former have theoretically
enriched the second lineage by placing it into their subcultural discursive
contexts. The substance of the Hegelian philosophy of history, which probably can be found in Hegel's winged expression Die Weltgeschichte ist das
Weltgericht, has been quite differently grasped by those subcultures. This is
why the Hegelisms of Bradley and Collingwood, of Croce and Gentile, and
of Herzen and Russian Westernizers seem to be quite different phenomena:
these basic differences obviously lie in the historical and (sub)cultural backgrounds of the adopting (sub)cultures, not only in individual differences
between the Hegelians.
To the contrary of Herder to whom Dumont refers as a true exponent of the German search for collective identity contrasted to French individualism, "Fichte explicitly set out to be the philosopher of the French
Revolution." As the latter is taken by Dumont as a phenomenon of the
whole European culture, not^mly of French (sub)culture, it is small wonder
that "[...] he has often been considered in Germany, notably by the historian
Meinecke writing before the First World War, as a precursor of
pan-Germanism or of the theory that binds the State to the collective
will-to- power of a people," while "[...] Martial Gueroult, the French
philosopher who has given a painstaking exegesis of Fichte's system, has
been deeply concerned with showing that Fichte throughout his life and
writings remained perfectly faithful to the Revolution, and that whatever
else is found in Fichte on that level is quite secondary, whether it te his
deeply German manner of thinking and feeling, or his 'German messian42

43
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ism,' not to speak of the misunderstandings and falsifications he has been
submitted to [.,.]."
It should be noted that Dumont fails to show how the basic ideological principle - namely the secularizing individualism - works in shaping, or reshaping, the deepest structures of theoretical thought. For instance,
it remains unclear how the will- to-transcendence within German thought
transforms itself into the will-to-culture. It might shed a new light not only
on how the upcoming Geschichtsphilosophie and Kulturphilosophie eventually took the place of the classical metaphysics and particularly of ontology,
but also on how philosophy itself has acquired the totally secularizing force
throughout the history of ideas.
We should understand why Dumont contrasts - mainly from the
viewpoint of employing the elements of hierarchy within social thought Fichte to Herder. Though Dumont finds Fichte a true equalitarian on the
political level, Fichte is seen by him as a bearer of a hierarchical form of
thought. Dumont states:
44

[...] Fichte is on the whole a stranger to the Herderian and
romantic notion of the diverse characters of cultures or peoples
as so many facets of the richness of the universal Whole. When
he does use this notion in a passage of the thirteenth address [in
the Addresses to the German Nation], it is part of a clever argument directed precisely against the romantic dream of a new
Christian-Germanic Empire. More generally, it is true that
Fichte adopts in that period the current stereotypes of the excellence of the German character, of the German language, etc....,
but he does so essentially in order to state a hierarchy among
peoples in the name of the very values of universalism. Now I
contend that, apart from any borrowing from the Romantics, it is
possible to show the presence in Fichte's thought in general,
alongside of a strong individualistic-cum-universalistic stress,
of a holistic aspect and more especially of a hierarchical component. I shall leave out here the holistic tendency, very strong in
the authoritarian socialism of the Closed Commercial State, and
which could be found also in passages of other texts - uneasily
cohabiting with individualistic features, but this is after all an
ubiquitous trait in modern thought, including sociological
thought. [...] What is more noteworthy is the emergence, all
along the works of Fichte, and in clear contrast with the
Enlightenment and French revolutionary thinking, of a hierarchical form of thought.
45

It may be true but, nonetheless, a question arises: how could
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol32/iss32/2
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Dumont explain the strange similarity between Fichte's Addresses and messianic theories that in turn also state a "hierarchy among peoples in the
name of the very values of universalism?" And why Hegel's notion of the
historic nations is no longer hierarchical? Dumont probably would say that
the point is that Fichte's approach implies, more or less, the encompassing
of the contrary that lies at the very basis of the hierarchical relation, while
messianism, or even Hegelism, is nothing but the dangerous confusion of
hierarchical ambition and individualism.
In spite of Dumont's emphasis frequently placed on hierarchy as a
pure theoretical construction, a principle in accord to which the social whole
should be designed (for Dumont, a hierarchy as such has in principle nothing to do with politics), one may easily find a number of dangers that result
from his principal rejection of a clear distinction between methodology and
ideology. The numerous advantages of Dumontian thought may turn into
dangerous disadvantages. This problem will be discussed below.
It is not enough for Dumont to uncover the elements of hierarchy
on the ideological level of Fichte's thought. He is going forward in uncovering that on the methodological, or metaphysical, level. This is to say,
Dumont finds Fichte's system of philosophy hierarchically organized.
The examples of hierarchy I just referred to are yet details, local,
almost anecdotic occurrences. Far more weighty, decisive indeed
in my view is the presence of the hierarchical opposition at the
very heart of Fichte's system of philosophy, in that dialectic of
the 'I' (or self) and the 'Not-I' (not-self) which constitutes the
foundation of his Wissenschaftslehre (1794), the 'transcendental
dialectic,' as Philonenko calls it, that establishes the conditions
of all knowledge. The demonstration lies at hand, for it is the 'I'
that posits the 'not-I.' As in the case of Adam and Eve, there are
two levels in the relationship: on the first level, the I or self is
undifferentiated, it is the absolute I or self; on the second level,
the self posits within itself the not-self; and ipso-facto posits
itself as against the not-self, so that we have, facing each other,
the self and the not-self. The not-self is on the one hand contained within the self, on the other hand it is the opposite of self.
This strictly hierarchical disposition of the Fichtean dialectic is
noteworthy from many angles, especially perhaps with regard to
Kant and to Hegel. On the one hand it is the hierarchical disposition that allows Fichte to integrate into a whole Kant's two
Reasons, pure Reason and practical Reason. On the other hand,
Hegel's dialectic will be no more hierarchical.
46

Although Dumont is undoubtedly profound and, in many respects,
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1995

9

Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 32 [1995], No. 32, Art. 2

Leonidas Donskis

11

quite right in defining the "very heart of Fichte's system of philosophy," we
should take the just quoted passage critically. Everything here sounds fascinating but exactly the same can be said about almost every case - at least,
about the Cartesian one - of solipsistic thinking. Solipsism, if taken in its
classical, or paradigmatical, shape, consists of the same principle of hierarchical complementarity, as it has been successfully exemplified by Dumont
with concentric circles. The point perhaps is that solipsism as such is, by its
logical and metaphysical nature, a phenomenon of hierarchy par excellence.
How could we explain, for instance, the Cartesian principle of lumen naturale intellectus by avoiding the hierarchical relationship between human
consciousness (in Descartes' own terms, ens cogitans) and the supreme
guarantee of true knowledge (the Supreme Being)? Thus the basic difference
between Cartesian solipsism and the Fichtean one lies in their theoretical
destination, not in their hierarchical qualities: solipsism of Descartes is epistemological, while that of Fichte is ontological.
Does it not mean that the problem of hierarchy lies not only in
Weltanschauung, or, to use Dumont's analytical language, in ideology, but in
the internal organization of theoretical thought per sel Is it accidental that
the classical German idealism (Kant, Fichte, and Hegel), as shown by
Dumont, is - in all respects - oriented toward universalism (though Dumont
recognizes Fichte as the only hierarchical thinker among German idealists),
while the Sturm and Drang movement, or the German preromanticism, arises - especially in the case of Herder's Volk - as the "historicist or monadic
lineage" essentially representing a (con)fusion of holism and individualism?
Is Dumont able to explicate this only by showing that Fichte and Hegel have
been obviously magnetized by the French Revolution? Or is it merely a
problem of theoretical discourse and of its inner organization?
Every analytical interpreter, or rather exegete, of Dumont's theory
of the national variants of modern ideology should address these questions
to himself rather than to Dumont. In light of Dumont's impressively coherent theory, the above questions seem to be neither complicated nor crucial.
They become problematical if translated into a different theoretical framework or into a different analytical language.
The second national variant is being associated by Dumont with the
German idea of liberty according to Troeltsch. Dumont begins his analysis
from Troeltsch's definition of the German idea of liberty: state socialism and
culture individualism [BildungsindividualismusLater
Dumont formalizes this sharp definition by reducing it to the formula "self-dedication +
Bildung."
It is quite enough to pay attention to a few of Dumont's introductory notes on this issue to grasp how distinct the German idea of liberty is in
48
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comparison with the French or the English tradition - "for brevity we shall
call it Western, as he [Troeltsch] does" - of liberty. According to Troeltsch,
it springs up as "an organized unity of the people based on a rigorous and at
the same time critical devotion of the individual to the whole, which is complemented and legitimized by the independence and individuality of the free
spiritual culture [Bildung]"
The spontaneous adhesion to the social whole seems to have been
deeply grounded in German thought, including also sociological thought.
For Dumont, "this spontaneous adhesion to the social whole is exactly what
Toennies called 'spontaneous will' (Naturwille), for him the characteristic
trait of the community or Gemeinschaft as opposed to the 'arbitrary will'
(Kiirwille) of the individual subject in the society (Gesellschaft) [...].""
In other words, the German idea of liberty refers to, as Troeltsch
would say, "service by the individual at his place in the function allotted to
him," not to equality. This is why, Troeltsch sums up, "the liberty of the
German is willed discipline, advancement and development of one's own
self in a whole and for a whole." It is obvious that such a notion of liberty
is incompatible with the paradigmatically accepted French or English, i.e.
Western, tradition of liberty. Small wonder, then, that Dumont points out:
49

50

52

Troeltsch knows very well, and he says so, that the French or
English tradition [...] cannot see liberty in that formulation but
only autocracy, slavery, etc. [...] He simply maintains that that is
how liberty is according to Hegel, and how it is expressed, one
way or another, 'in all the great German creations of the century' [...], and in the Socialist party as well as in the army.
Troeltsch traces the origin of this disposition back to the seventeenth century [...]. It results from the transformation of
Christian submission to the patriarchal-absolutist State under the
influence of the Western spirit of Enlightenment. The State was
modified, and 'the submissive believer turned into the freely
obedient and devoted citizen, who participates in the general will
by fulfilling his duty in his place and freely exercising his criticism' [...]. German liberty is thus a 'secularization of the religious sense of duty and, in particular, its intensification into an
activity of creation in common [mitgestaltendY [...]. Here we
perceive a recognition of acculturation: we are dealing with a traditional holism that was modified or transformed under the influence of 'the spirit of liberty and independence [Miindigkeit]'

This devotion to the State, nevertheless, leaves the place for the
purely internal individualism that derives from Bildung, or the free spiritual
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1995
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culture based on the idea of self-cultivation. This split between the external
world (basically represented by the state and its policy) and the internal one
(essentially conceived as Selbstbildung, i.e. self-construction, self-education, or cultivation), or, in Dumont's terms, a deep separation between externality and internality, may throw a new light on the exceptional place and
character of the German intellectual whose prototype is Luther. "It is impossible not to see a descendant of Luther in the Bildung intellectual. Not necessarily a follower - he may even be an atheist - but a descendant."
In other words, the German idea of liberty based on the paradoxical combination of state socialism (the idea of the omnipotent, universal
State) and culture individualism - that is, on the German formula "self-dedication + Bildung" - is merely an inversion of the Western idea of liberty. It
is not accidental that the German intellectual has come to subtract politics
from the realm of culture, while the Western (respectively the French and
English) intellectuals have considered it to be not only a phenomenon of culture, but also a true space of freedom. According to Bruford, even "the ordinary middle-class man here [in Germany], if he ever thought about culture,
never considered politics to be part of it, and still does not do so today. To
ask him to transfer his allegiance from inwardness to the objective, to politics, to what the peoples of Europe call freedom, would seem to him to
amount to a demand that he should do violence to his own nature, and in fact
give up his sense of national identity."
Where does this phenomenon come from? And is the great theme
of a nonpolitical man, expressed by Thomas Mann and other German intellectuals of the twentieth century (especially by Hermann Hesse and the
Bildungsroman in general), the logical continuation of the crucial tendencies
of German ideology that sprang from the Reformation? Dumont suggests:
54

55

In more ways than one, Luther is the prototype of the German
intellectual. He is so in particular as a writer, in his basic contribution to the development of the German language, but also as
the representative of the German people in relation to the
Catholic Church and hence on the world scene, as witnessed by
his popularity, which means that to a great extent the Germans
recognized themselves in him. This function of representative or
mediator between the German people and the 'Western' or universal culture passed on to the German writer and thinker.
Troeltsch indicates or implies this, and others have noticed it,
even Lukacs. It comes out clearly from Thomas Mann's analysis
in his war book [Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen] [...], and
the role is essential. If we are to understand it, we must reflect
that in a period when there is no political but only cultural unity,
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/ccr/vol32/iss32/2
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the function of representative devolving elsewhere upon a head
of state or an ambassador quite naturally falls on a Goethe, a
Hegel, or perhaps a Beethoven. Besides, the German themselves
are well aware of this when, as so often, they tell us that
Germans have achieved in ideas what others have accomplished
on the world scene. And so did Marx. We cannot understand
German literature and thought if we neglect this role of representative or mediator in the German intellectual at the height of
his renown [...].*

Both a deep separation between externality and internality and the
function of the representative or the mediator between the German people
and the "Western" or universal culture may be found in the Bildungsroman
that appears to have been designed as a pure German phenomenon. In his
Das Glasperlenspiel, Hermann Hesse deals with a fatal separation between
vita activa and vita contemplativa that seems to be merely a variation of the
same great theme of German culture. It is extremely important that Hesse
has obviously enriched the above function of mediator by directing him (in
the symbolic identification of narrator and himself) to a civilization of the
East.
At the same time, we should grasp why culture as such has been
frequently identified by the German philosophers of the nineteenth century
(basically by the exponents of Lebensphilosophie and by neo-Kantians)
exceptionally with spiritual culture. Dumont might have concerned himself
with how - and whether - a strict distinction between Naturwissenschaften
and Geisteswissenschaften (in the case of Dilthey and neo-Kantians) as
well as that between culture and civilization (from Wilhelm von Humboldt
to Oswald Spengler) emerged nowhere but in Germany. Dumont also might
have supplemented his studies of German culture with the case of Spengler
who has come to emphasize the self-dedication of the intellectual to the
State, instead of insisting on the priority of Bildung or Selbstbildung over
devotion to the State. This kind of analysis, however, remains to be done by
someone who would be able to employ Dumont's analytical equipment in
the studies of German culture.
Shall we go back to Dumont's analysis of the German idea of liberty, as it has been interpreted by Troeltsch and then by Thomas Mann? The
latter has noticed a few things of great importance for a Franco-German
comparison. In his Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man, Thomas Mann states:
Out of the liberty and sovereignty of the Germans Luther made
something accomplished by turning them inward and thus keeping them forever out of the sphere of political quarrels.
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Protestantism has deprived politics of its spiritual goad and has
made it a practical matter [...]."

Dumont generalizes this statement in the following way:
Here, in the author's own language, is a deep insight supported
by Hegel and Carlyle. 'Hegel said that France would know no
rest for lack of a Reformation' [...], and Carlyle saw in the
Revolution a 'bad substitute' for Reformation [...]. It is worth
trying to grasp the matter more firmly in our own language and
to characterize the two contrasting forms of individualism. That
of Luther is located on the religious plane. It is directed against
the religious division of labor and against the hierarchy: all
Christians become priests and retrieve from the Church the
responsibility for their own salvation. There results an internalization and the subordination of everything else to the inner life
of the Christian. Politics, especially, is subordinated, the State is
subordinated, and by the same token it is accepted as life and
power, with its division of labor: there are specialists in government because it is of no import.
58

If this is so, can we say, slightly modifying Thomas Mann's
thought, that the German Reformation immunized the German against the
Revolution, i.e. against the extraverted French individualism, while the
French Revolution has done something vice versa by immunizing the
Frenchmen/Frenchwomen against the experience of the German
Reformation, i.e. against the introverted German individualism? According
to Dumont, this would be but a too hasty conclusion: "Even if Lutheranism
has had an effect on the political constitution of Germany, it is not entirely
responsible for it. The crucial fact on the ideological level - hitherto not
clearly singled out, it seems - is probably the emergence in the West of the
modern type of sovereignty - territorial sovereignty - and its absence in
Germany."
The internal, or introverted, individualism, i.e. the politics-free culture individualism, we have just recently discussed unavoidably led to a
purely elitarian notion of culture that resulted from a deep split between
intellectuals and ordinary people (the commoners can submit themselves to
the omnipotent State, while the elite finds its high destination in submitting
itself to Bildung). This fact may explain a number of the many- sided phenomena that appeared in modern social history (a Dumontian model of the
history of ideas seems to be extremely fruitful in doing so), and among them
that of an acceptance of totalitarianism (or rather the non-resistance to it).
We may easily find this phenomenon not only in Germany, but also in other
59
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national variants, particularly in Russia. Isaiah Berlin, in his brilliant study
Russian Thinkers, has shown how a deep split between the average people
and the so-called Russian intelligentsia has promoted both the Utopian
stance and the ideological isolation of the Russian cultural elite.
Dumont sums up the hidden, invisible correspondence between the
German idea of liberty and the upcoming German imperialism (and then
totalitarianism) as follows:
60

In my view, we have here a major fact that has hitherto been concealed by the overestimation of material aspects and the neglect
of the ideological dimension, together with insufficient comparison with the Western neighbors. It follows that Germany, once
unified by Prussia, was Janus-headed: on the international level
it was a national or territorial State among others, while at the
level of internal representation it was a resurgence of universal
sovereignty. Such is perhaps the deepest explanation for the will
to dominate inherent in this 'Empire' or, in other words, for
pan-Germanism as a concomitant of the German idea of liberty
as defined by Troeltsch in 1916.
61

In his analysis of the national variants of modern ideology, Dumont
provides us with both an incisive analytical perspective and unusual but
nonetheless amazingly precise and inclusive formulations. I would even say
that we are able to uncover the different variants within the same (subculture, not only within European culture, by using Dumont's approach. Alas,
it is not enough to employ his terms and then to go further in the search for
the basic ideological principle of a particular civilization in one's comparative study, as Dumont himself would do: in doing so, one needs to become
an expert on at least two comparative civilizations. Dumont's attendveness
to empirical evidence is a part of his method. And Dumont's fallacies that
are to be discussed seem to be nothing but a continuation of his virtues.
This is why we should take his locus minoris critically. The latter
seems to acquire a certain arbitrariness by exemplifying the basic thesis and
insisting on a hopelessly unconvincing argument. This may be said, above
all, about his conception of totalitarianism.
The Totalitarian Disease
It goes without saying that one should welcome Dumont's conditio
sine qua non in throwing a new light on the origins of totalitarianism. It may
be defined as the emphasis placed on the modern origin of totalitarianism,
on the one hand, and as the principal rejection of historical continuity as an
Published by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1995
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explanation of this issue, on the other.
Too much has been done using historical continuity as an explanation. The continuance of anti-Semitism since the Middle Ages
no more explains the sinister invention of extermination than an
undeniable continuity in German ideology explains the catastrophic episode of the Nazi degeneration [italics mine]. Aside
from French interpreters, who have a feeling for this ideological
continuity (but to feel is one thing and to reason is another), there
has been a tendency either to link Hitlerism directly to German
romanticism or to reject everything in German culture that
diverged from the straight line of the Enlightenment and its
claimed extension in Marxism as 'irrational' and as automatically paving the way for National Socialism. [...] These are partisan
and mutilating views, which in the last analysis show an inability to understand not just the Nazi phenomenon but German ideology itself and its necessity as a national variant of modern ideology.
62

In other words, the quintessence of both the racist anti- Semitism
and National Socialism, according to Dumont, lies in the continuity of
German ideology, not in historical continuity. Social history as such is
unable to uncover the deepest ideological structures: this is why Dumont's
methodological preference is made by referring to the history of ideas or
intellectual history.
Generally speaking, Dumont finds German totalitarianism nothing
but the logical and even necessary continuation of the German national variant of modern ideology. Totalitarianism thus is neither a pure expression of
some metaphysical evil nor merely some sort of social pathology. A solution
of this horrible enigma of our time can be attained by rediscovering the mysterious link between German culture and the German State. Dumont puts it
in the following way:
We found, first, that the introverted individualism of the
Lutheran Reformation had allowed the Germans to resist the
extraverted individualism of the French Revolution and, second,
that they had remained adepts of a primitive type of sovereignty,
namely universal sovereignty. The first feature accounts for the
sharp separation between culture and politics and, incidentally,
for Thomas Mann's suspicion of social- political questions. The
second feature explains how the Prusso-German State found
support for its aggressive foreign policy among German intellectuals, as if pan- Germanism was the only - or the main attribute of the State that German culture accepted as genuine, in
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other words the only - or the main - positive link between
German culture and the German State.
63

But it should be noted that these are the most convincing parts of
Dumont's conception of totalitarianism. The issue seems to become something like a cul-de-sac for Dumont's analytical discourse. His analytical
language works somewhat until it becomes clear that Dumont's key concepts — those of individualism and holism, — after being placed in such an
unusual context, lose their original incisiveness. "The hypothesis is that
totalitarianism results from the attempt, in a society where individualism is
deeply rooted and predominant, to subordinate it to the primacy of the society as a whole. It combines, unknowingly, conflicting values." Kavolis
writes on this issue:
64

The least convincing part of Dumont's critique of modernity is
his derivation of totalitarianism from 'individualist-artificialism.' It is not in the most 'individualist-artificialist' parts of the
West - those with a strong Calvinist influence - that totalitarianism has acquired power but rather in those in which cultural tradition contained strong holist-hierarchic elements.
Totalitarianism is favored by an encounter of political modernization with a deficiency of cultural modernity in the deeper
sense. This may yet prove to be true of technocracy as well.
65

We can agree with Dumont when he shows not only the basic similarities between the Nazi movement on the one hand, and the Marxist and
Bolshevik movement on the other, but also the basic differences between
them. In spite of his fallacies that are to be discussed, Dumont's comparative study of the above totalitarian movements is of exceptional value for the
further studies of this subject. Among other things, he notes:
In Mein Kampf, Hitler explained very clearly that he designed
his movement as a sort of antithetical copy of the Marxist and
Bolshevik movement, replacing, among other things, the class
struggle by a race struggle. We are here confronted with an international process. What strikes one as a modern trait in the broadest sense is a historical chain of successive outbiddings or, I
would say, a kind of hubris of the will. Marx inherits the titanic
speculation of the German philosophers [...] and intensifies it:
instead of interpreting the world, he is going to change it by
means of an alliance between philosophy and the proletariat.
Hence the 'professional revolutionary,' Lenin, who goes one step
farther: Russian populism has proclaimed the possibility of the
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Russian people's overtaking bourgeois Western civilization,
which leads Lenin to the idea that the small group of conspirators who call themselves the Bolshevik party will be able to skip
the capitalist stage of economic development altogether and lead
Russia directly from Tsarism to Socialism [...]. Along comes
Hitler, who rejects the Bolsheviks' ideology but picks up the
instrument of power they have forged and combines their party
model with a quite different ideology. What is increasing here
from stage to stage is the ambition of a few men to impose their
will upon history, and their actual power to manipulate people
[italics mine].
66

This may be true but, nevertheless, one wonders why such a profound thinker as Dumont has reduced the phenomenon of totalitarianism to
that of German National Socialism. It goes without saying that the concept
of totalitarianism is too broad to reduce it to the Nazi movement. The
Russian Communism (to use Berdyaev's term), or the Soviet totalitarianism,
as a matter of fact, in many respects (the omnipotence of the State and the
absolute powerlessness and weakness of a particular individual, the complete elimination of even a partial economic freedom, an exercise of the universal State Control) has even surpassed its German alter ego. We can
respect the personal - in fact, the uniquely individual - experience of a
scholar and to take it seriously in our considerations; however, from this
point of view, Dumont's analysis of totalitarianism remains merely a pars
pro toto.
Let us refer once again to Kavolis' review. After he has made
Dumont's formulation we are discussing here more precise and adequate
("When an illusion about the nature of society becomes identical with power
over it, totalitarianism results" ), Kavolis states:
67

This would seem to be a more adequate formulation than
Dumont's own, which is so urgently directed to accounting for
Nazism that it does not explain the conquest of power by
Communism in Russia or China. [...] Individualism has never
been the dominant emphasis in either Russia or China, and
Communist efforts to subordinate it to the primacy of the society
as a whole were directed at what was perceived as either the
anarchy (in Russia) or the inefftcacy (in China) of recently intensified individualist challenges (including revolutionary ones) to
traditional holism. Totalitarianism is more likely to be a reassertion of traditional holism in a new guise against the threat of rising individualism than an effort of previously subordinated
holism to suppress traditionally dominant individualism [italics
mine].
68
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Russian Communism seems never to have been grounded in
Western modernity sensu stricto. Although Russian intellectuals, or rather
the Russian intelligentsia, has been under the spell of ideas produced by
German philosophy (especially by Herder, German Romanticism in general,
and Hegel for a long time, Russian Communism, by a historical paradox,
has in principle nothing to do with either the social history or the intellectual history of the West. In fact, Russian Communism sprang from the
Byzantine heritage of caesaropapism and the phenomenon of sacrosanctus
(the complete fusion of ideological authority and political power that
unavoidably led to, as Dumont would say, the civilizationally "abnormal"
situation).
It is extremely important that Russia has never had the ideologically - not only religiously in the narrow sense - secularized society. Russia
seems to have always lacked what Eisenstadt calls the autonomous cultural
elite. Although the ideological function of the Russian intellectual slightly
reminds one of that of the German intellectual in being something of a mediator between his own culture and that of the "West," it springs up, in the two
cases, from quite different sources: as Dumont has shown, all the modern
phenomena of German culture derive from the deeply rooted cultural individualism (obviously contrasted to political individualism) and the German
idea of liberty formalized in the German formula "self-dedication +
Bildung," whereas the Russian intelligentsia seems to have always been
fighting for the acceptance of the foreign ideas, instead of producing its own
sociocultural projects.
But the graceful metaphor that Russia appears as the anti- scenario,
or as the inverted mirror, of the West (since Ivan the Terrible has consciously inverted social structure into anti- structure by subverting even the symbolic meanings of Western civilization) may explain nothing in either the
comparative approach or the analytical perspective based on the history of
ideas. The Russian messianism, if taken without a pejorative connotation of
this term, is in turn nothing but the powerful resistance of Russian culture (it
would be quite enough to recall, for instance, the Russian Slavophiles)
against the political modernization basically represented by the politics of
Westernization, introduced by Peter the Great, and, in part, by the so-called
Russian Zapadniks (Westernizers).
This is why we, in taking totalitarianism in its broadest sense and
not reducing it to Nazism, should agree with Kavolis that "totalitarianism is
favored by an encounter of political modernization with a deficiency of cultural modernity in the deeper sense.
Finally, are the German cultural individualism and the German ideological formula of liberty the only reasons to explain the wide acceptance
69
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of totalitarianism among intellectuals? The history of modern political ideas
shows us how widespread the acceptance of reactionary and totalistic ideas
was among the French intellectuals. How should we grasp the cases of
Maurice Barres, Charles Maurras, and Georges Sorel? The ideas of the radical and integral nationalism and of syndicalism were even more popular in
France than in Germany.
We should also recall the phenomenon of racism which Dumont
refers to as a part of the German national variant of modern ideology.
Though Dumont demonstrates how Gobineau's racism (Essai sur I'inegalite
des races humaines) has been eventually transformed by Hitler from a purely negative doctrine to the highly positive one, racism in his theory remains
explained neither as an internationally widespread and then accepted doctrine nor as a phenomenon obviously transcending the boundaries of a particular national variant.
In spite of this critical assessment, Dumont seems to belong to
those rare and exceptional thinkers whose fallacies may enrich the modern
theoretical discourse incomparably more than one's banal truth. He provides
cross-cultural studies with both his sharp, precise analytical language and an
unprecedentedly incisive analytical perspective. No one engaged in current
studies of ideology, including civilizational sociologists, intellectual historians, philosophers, and cultural theoreticians, will be able to pass by
Dumont's theory which has come to uncover the hidden phenomena (and
unpredictable inspirations) of the empirically invisible ideological-historical drama of humanity.
Klaipeda University, Lithuania
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NOTES
28. Dumont, From Mandeville to Marx, op. cit., p. 14.
29. To use Philip Bagby's terms, Dumont's "national variants" should be called "cultures," while "subcultures" might be perceived as the different variants of the same
"culture," or of the same "national variant." In this case, the modern European ideology should be treated as a "superculture" rather than a "culture." Dumont has obviously introduced these key terms as the specific constituents of his theoretical construction.
30. Unfortunately, this problem seems to have been left outside of Dumont analystical concern. The dissemination of the basic ideas and values of modern ideology
within - or their transmissio to - the national variants inevitably depends, more or
less, on the national language. The latter, sooner or later, the various waves of modernization (particularly by the modern nationalism as the modernizing factor). An
ideology always manifests itself as the logocracy, i.e. as the domination of repressive, or, at least, prescriptive, language. It may be said, first of all, about he manifesto
ideologies eliminating all the possible visions of the world.
31. Dumont, Essays on Individualism, op. cit., p. 113.
32. Ibid., p. 115.
33. Ibid., p. 116.
34. Ibid., pp. 117-118.
35. Ibid., p. 119.
36. Ibidem.
31. From this point of view, a Dumontian interpretation of the Christ's sermon ("render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar', but unto God the things that are God's"
in hierarchical terms is a brilliant example of his method in action. Ibid., pp. 31-32.
38. Ibid., p. 118.
39. On the original meaning of the individual, see Rayond Williams, Keywords: A
Vocabulary of Culture and Society (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp.
133-136.
40. Cited from Alfred Louis Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture: A Critical
Review of Concepts and Definitions (New York: Vintage Books, 1952), pp. 53-54.
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41. Ibid., pp. 290-291, Kluckhohn notes:
The danger in the construal of culture as an emergent level evidently lies
in the consequent tendency to reify or hypostasize culture, to view it as a
distinctive substance or actual superorganism, and then to assume that it
moves through autonomous, immanent forces. Spengler certainly believed
this; so did Forbenius, at least at times; and Kroeber has been flatly
charged with the same errors by Boas, Benedict, and Bidney, besides incurring opposition to the concept of the superorganic from Sapir and
Goldenweiser.
42. For instance, Alexander Herzen, one of the most prominent Russian Hegelians,
has never believed in the alleged historic laws. His emphasis, placed on the historyfree human morality, can be grasped only within the historical-cultural background
of Russia in the nineteenth century. Isaiah Berlin, Russian Thinkers
(Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 95, referring to Herzen's From the Other
Shore, writes:
Man 'wants to be neither a passive grave-digger or the past, not the unconscious midwife of the future [. . .].' He want s to live in his own day. His
morality cannot be derived from the laws of history (which do not exist)
nor from the objective goals of human progress (there are none such - they
change with changing circumstances and persons). Moral ends are what
people want for their own sake. 'The truly free man creates his own morality [• • •]•'
43. Dumont, Essays on Individualism, op. cit., p. 121.
44. Ibidem.
45. Ibid., p. 123.
46. Louis Dumont, "German Idealism in Comparative Perspective: Hierarchy in the
Though of Fichet," in E. V. Walter, Vytautas Kavolis, Edmund Leites and Marie coleman Nelson, eds., Civilizations East and West: A Memorial Volume for Benjamin
Nelson (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1985). p. 109.
47. Dumont, Essays on Individualism, op cit., p. 133.

48. Ibid., p. 146.
49. Ibid., p. 135.
50. Cited from Dumont, Essays on Individualism, op. cit., p. 133.

51. Ibid., p. 134.
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52. Ibid., p. 135.
53. Ibidem.
54. Ibid., pp. 139-140.
55. Cited from Dumont, Essays on Individualism, op. cit., p. 139.
56. Ibid., pp. 140-141.
57. Cited from Dumont, Essays on Individualism, op. cit., p. 144.
58. Ibid., pp. 144-145.
59. Ibid., p. 145.
60. Berlin, Russian Thinkers, op.cit., p. 117, points out: "Most Russian historians are
agreed that the great social schism between the educated and the 'dark fold' in
Russian history sprang from the wound inflicted on Russian society by Peter the
Great." Further on this issue, see pp. 114-135.
61. Dumont, Essays on Individualism, op. cit., pp. 147-148.
62. Ibid., p. 150.
63. Ibid., p. 153.
64. Dumont, From Mandeville to Marx, op. cit., p. 12.
65. Kavolis, "Civilizational Paradigms," op. cit., p. 138.
66. Dumont, Essays on Individualism, op. cit., pp. 150-151.
67. Kavolis, "Civilizational Paradigms," op. cit., p. 134.
68. Ibid., p. 138.
69. The Russian Slavophils may be described - in may respects - as the successors
of Herder and of the German Romanticism, while the Russian Zapadniks
(Westernizers) seem to have been the move complicated and many-sided case in the
intellectual history of Russia. Their mainstream has been deeply influenced by Hegel
and in part, his German disciples, while a number of other Zapadniks were under the
impact of the French Enlightenment and, to be sure, of French positivism.
Both the Russian organicism and even the reactionary pan-Slavism (the
latter has culminated in Danilevsky's Russia and Europe), not to speak of the soPublished by BYU ScholarsArchive, 1995
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called apocalyptic philosophy of history, sprang from Heinrich Riickert's ideas, not
only from Herder's historiosophical theory. The most magnetizing impact of German
philosophy to Russian philosophy, however, has been made through Spengler's Der
Untergang des Abendlandes.
70. Kavolis, "Civilizational Paradigms," op. cit., p. 138.
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